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Rob Fraser*
This article analyses the modi¢ed form of ad valorem royalty recently announced
by the WA government in relation to gold production, which features a threshold
price below which there is no tax liability and compares this royalty with a pro¢t-
based royalty. The level at which the threshold price is set plays an important role
in determining the performance of the royalty in relation to its impact on
production and the expected level and variability of tax revenue. It is argued that
the higher this price is set, the stronger the grounds for preferring a pro¢t-based
royalty, even taking into account the reliability of each form for generating tax
revenue.
1. Introduction
In its 1997 Budget the Western Australian (WA) government introduced a
royalty on gold to take e¡ect in 1998. This royalty is of the ad valorem form
(i.e. based on revenue) rather than of the resource rent form (i.e. based on
pro¢ts). Subsequent developments in the gold market have resulted in the
WA government modifying its original proposal to delay the introduction of
the royalty and to make its collection contingent on the price of gold
exceeding a threshold level. In so doing, the WA government has responded
to the expressed concerns of the industry in relation to the detrimental
impact of the royalty on pro¢ts, especially in times of relatively low prices.
Moreover, at the same time it has created a novel form of resource taxation,
where the revenue base of the tax is modi¢ed to take account of periods of
unusually low pro¢ts, and where the price of gold is treated as a simple proxy
for the level of pro¢ts.
For imperfectly competitive industries there are a number of second-best
arguments which support the use of ad valorem taxes (Conrad and Hool
1981; Kay and Keen 1983; Fane and Smith 1986). However, economists have
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competitive mining industries, of which gold is perhaps an example (e.g.
Dowell 1978; Leland 1978; Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1975, 1979; Emerson
and Lloyd, 1983; Fraser, 1993, 1998). And so it is interesting to observe a
government struggling to modify its preferred form of taxation (i.e. ad
valorem) to provide a feature which is inherent in the structure of a pro¢t-
based tax. Moreover, it seems worthwhile to analyse the WA government's
novel form of resource taxation in order to assess the extent to which it
provides the acknowledged advantages of a purely pro¢t-based alternative.
Such an analysis is the aim of this article.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple model
of both forms of resource taxation which provides the basis for their
comparison using the concept of tax revenue neutrality. Section 3 undertakes
a numerical analysis of the two taxes in relation to the level of the threshold
price and the expected level and variability of market prices for gold. In
addition, this section considers the two taxes in relation to the bene¢ts from
improvements in production technology. The article ends with a brief
summary of the analysis, and concludes that the modi¢cation of an ad
valorem royalty to include a threshold price for tax liability diminishes the
two key advantages of such a tax relative to a pro¢t-based tax: its low rate
and its low revenue variability. This latter ¢nding is potentially a concern
given the view of the WA Department of Minerals and Energy (DOME
1994) that, because of the current signi¢cance of royalty receipts as a
proportion of total government income (around 10 per cent), revenue
stability is a key characteristic of the state's royalty system.
2. The model
The mining company is assumed to be a price-taker and that this price p
is uncertain at the time of the production decision. In the absence of any
resource taxation, the company's objective is to maximise expected pro¢ts
Ep by the optimal choice of production level y:
Ep  Epy ÿ cy 1




In this case optimal production will occur where expected price is equal to
marginal cost:
 p  c
0y 2
where:  p  expected price.
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price exceeds a threshold level ^ p, so that the pro¢t function in the presence
of the royalty can be written as:
1
pv  py ÿ cy if p  ^ p
pv  py ÿ cy ÿ vpy if p > ^ p:
3








py ÿ vpyfpdp ÿ cy 4
where: fp  probability distribution governing price.
And optimal production is given by:





which may be rearranged to give:
 p ÿ vE pjp > ^ p   1 ÿ F^ p    c
0y 6
where: F^ p  cumulative probability of ^ p exceeding p, Epjp > ^ p 
expected price given p exceeds ^ p.
A comparison of equations 5 and 2 shows clearly that the ad valorem
royalty reduces the expected revenue from extra production. As a
consequence, production is lower in the presence of this type of royalty than
in its absence. In addition, the derivative of the left-hand side of equation 5
with respect to ^ p is given by:
v^ pf^ p > 0:
Consequently, the lower is ^ p relative to  p, the stronger is the negative impact
of this royalty on production.
2 Finally, it is clear that the level of uncertainty
of price also a¡ects the strength of this impact. In particular, an increase in
uncertainty will a¡ect both the overall level and the spread of the probability
mass in the second term on the left-hand side of equation 5, and therefore
has an ambiguous analytical impact on the value of this term. Note that this
ambiguity will be clari¢ed during the numerical analysis of the next section.
1The royalty also only applies for production in excess of a threshold level. The
presumption here is that this production threshold is irrelevant to the company in
question.
2I am grateful to an anonymous referee for clarifying this result.
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by:
ET Rv  vEpjp > ^ py1 ÿ F^ p 7
while the variance of tax revenue VarT Rv is shown in the appendix to
be given by:
VarT Rv  ET Rv
2 ÿ 2ET RvvEpjp > ^ py1 ÿ F^ p
 v
2y
21 ÿ F^ pVarpjp > ^ p ÿ 1 ÿ F^ p p
2
 2 pEpjp > ^ p1 ÿ F^ p
8
where: Varpjp > ^ p  variance of p given p exceeds ^ p.
Re£ecting the impact of ^ p on the magnitude of the tax-related term in
equation 5, it can be seen from equation 7 that ET Rv decreases with





 ^ pvyf^ p2ET Rv ÿ vy^ p: 9
While for ^ p close to zero equation 9 shows that increases in ^ p increase
VarT Rv, for larger ^ p the impact of increases in ^ p on equation 8 is unclear.
This impact will also be clari¢ed in the numerical analysis of the next
section.
As an alternative to the WA gold royalty, next consider an overtly
pro¢t-based royalty. Such royalties also typically have a threshold feature,
with the company paying no resource taxation if pro¢ts are inadequate in
relation to the threshold, but tax being payable on excess pro¢ts. In the
resource rent tax literature this threshold is usually speci¢ed in relation to a
rate of return on capital.
4 However, in order to simplify the analysis, the
threshold speci¢ed here is an actual level of pro¢ts, with the level of capital
invested in production and the associated rate of return on this capital being
suppressed. In particular, pro¢ts in the presence of a pro¢t-based royalty
pt are given by:
pt  py ÿ cy if p  b
pt  py ÿ cy ÿ tpy ÿ cy ÿ b if p > b
10
where: b  threshold level of pro¢ts, t  rate of tax on surplus pro¢ts.
3I am grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this derivative.
4See for example, Fraser (1993).
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py ÿ cy ÿ tpy ÿ cy ÿ bfpdp
12
and optimal production is given by:














As with the ad valorem royalty, it can be seen from the left-hand side of
equation 13 that optimal production will be less than in the absence of
the pro¢t-based royalty. This distorting e¡ect arises because, while the
government shares relatively large positive pro¢t states (i.e. in excess of b)
with the company, it does not share relatively low positive and all negative
pro¢t states. Consequently, on balance the company is bene¢ting less from
increases in production in the presence of the royalty than in its absence.
5
However, a comparison of equations 5 and 13 does not indicate which of
the two royalty systems is relatively more distorting to production in
achieving equivalent expected tax revenues. Speci¢cally, although the pro¢t-
based royalty is payable only on marginal expected pro¢t (for p in excess
of b) as opposed to marginal expected revenue (for p in excess of ^ p) in the
case of the ad valorem royalty, the rate of tax on excess pro¢t t required
to achieve expected tax revenue neutrality with the ad valorem royalty will
exceed the rate for this royalty v. Consequently, the second terms of each
of the left-hand sides of equations 5 and 13 are of ambiguous relative
magnitude. This ambiguity will be clari¢ed in the numerical analysis of the
next section.
5I am grateful to an anonymous referee for correcting equation 13 and justifying this
result.
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by:









   
14
while the variance of tax revenue VarT Rt is shown in the appendix to
be given by:
VarT Rt  ET Rt
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   
:
15
Note that, even with t chosen to achieve:
ET Rv  ET Rt 16
a comparison of equations 8 and 15 reveals no unambiguous ranking of the
relative size of VarT Rv and VarT Rt. Once again, this ambiguity will be
clari¢ed by the numerical analysis of the next section.
3. Numerical analysis
The algebraic analysis of the previous section revealed ambiguities regarding
both the impact of changes in key parameters and the relative size of
particular expressions. Often, numerical analysis can clarify such ambiguities
and, with the choice of plausible parameter values, can provide a useful feel
for the central relationships of a model. Consequently, a numerical analysis
is undertaken in this section with the aim of illustrating and enhancing the
¢ndings of the algebraic analysis.
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the tax systems outlined in
the previous section, it is necessary to specify a probability distribution of
price, as well as a form of the cost function and values for the other
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distribution of prices is normal, in which case:
6
Epjp > ^ p   p  spZ^ p=1 ÿ F^ p 17
Varpjp > ^ p  s
2
p 1 




1 ÿ F^ p
ÿ
Z^ p
1 ÿ F^ p
 2 " #
: 18










In addition, the cost function is speci¢ed as:
cy  a  dy
c: 19
Finally, parameter values have been chosen as follows:
 p  500




Note that the expected price has been chosen to approximate prevailing
Australian dollar gold prices, while the coe¤cient of variation of price is
typical of the level of price variability of commodities traded on world
markets (Hazell, Jaramillo and Williamson 1990). Note also that unreported
numerical analysis indicates the overall pattern of results is unrelated both
to the speci¢cation of the cost function and to the magnitude of its
parameters.
On this basis, in the absence of any form of resource taxation:
y  100
Ep  25000:
The ad valorem royalty is speci¢ed at the actual rate which is to apply in
the case of WA gold:
v  0:025
6See Fraser (1988) for details. Note that the parameter values chosen below for the
probability distribution of prices mean that more than 99.95 per cent of the total probability
mass exceeds zero. Consequently, values calculated using these formulae are virtually
exact.
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speci¢ed such that the threshold level of pro¢ts is equal to half the total cost
of production in the absence of resource taxation:
b  0:5 cy  12500:
On this basis the company's income must exceed 150 per cent of its costs
before any resource taxation is payable. Finally, the rate of tax on excess
pro¢ts t is speci¢ed such that:
ET Rt  ET Rv
for each threshold price.
7
Table 1 provides details of this numerical analysis. Focusing initially on
the results for the ad valorem royalty, it can be seen that, consistent with the
¢nding in section 1, the `pure' ad valorem royalty (i.e. ^ p  0) yields the
greatest expected tax revenue but also has the largest distorting e¡ect on
production. Moreover, the variance of tax revenue is lowest in this case.
Higher levels of the threshold price are bene¢cial to the company's expected
pro¢ts and in association with this are less distorting of production. But
Table 1 Numerical analysis of ad valorem and profit-based royalties
y Ep
Tax Rate
(%) ET R VarT R
No taxation 100 25000 ^ ^ ^
^ p  0
Ad valorem 97.5 23765.1 2.5 1219.3 132991
Pro¢t-based
a 99.2 23779.2 8.6 1219.3 975820
^ p  350
Ad valorem 97.7 23870.7 2.5 1116.3 296838
Pro¢t-based
a 99.3 23882.5 7.9 1116.3 818286
^ p  450
Ad valorem 98.1 24078.9 2.5 912.4 494954
Pro¢t-based
a 99.4 24086.8 6.4 912.4 547145
^ p  500
Ad valorem 98.5 24231.4 2.5 762.6 562937
Pro¢t-based 99.5 24236.8 5.4 762.6 382437
Note:
a b  12500
7Note that the relationship between b and t with this expected revenue neutrality
requirement is quite straightforward. In particular, a lower value of b means that resource
taxation becomes payable at a lower level of pro¢ts and therefore the value of t required to
achieve expected revenue neutrality is also lower.
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variance of tax revenue. Note that this increase in the variance of tax revenue
at higher levels of ^ p follows from the positive impact of an increase in ^ p on
the probability of zero tax revenue. This increase in the likelihood of an
extreme outcome (i.e. zero) both reduces expected tax revenue and increases
its variance. Finally, recalling the algebraic ambiguity in section 2 of
equation 9 @VarT Rv=@^ p; note that table 1 clari¢es the sign of this
expression for ^ p up to  p.
Turning to the pro¢t-based royalty, it can be seen that for each ^ p the
optimal level of production is higher than in the case of the ad valorem
royalty. This feature of the results clari¢es the ambiguity identi¢ed in section
2 regarding whether expected tax revenue neutrality could be achieved by
the pro¢t-based royalty with less distortion to the optimal level of
production than that of the ad valorem royalty.
In addition, it can be seen that the rate of tax on excess pro¢ts required
to achieve tax revenue-neutrality is dependent on the level of ^ p. For
example, matching the expected tax revenue of the `pure' ad valorem
royalty requires a rate of 8.6 per cent on excess pro¢ts compared with the
ad valorem rate of 2.5 per cent revenue.
8 In addition, for this case revenue
from the pro¢t-based royalty is considerably more variable than from the
ad valorem royalty. These results are consistent with the ¢ndings of Fraser
and Kingwell (1997) that in general the tax rate on pro¢t needs to be higher
than that on revenue to generate the same amount of tax, and that the
revenue from a pro¢ts tax is generally more variable than that from a pure
revenue tax. However, the results in table 1 also show that, if the form of
the ad valorem royalty is modi¢ed by the introduction of a threshold price
for tax liability, then the relationship between the two forms of taxation is
also modi¢ed. In particular, the tax-revenue neutral rate of tax on excess
pro¢ts decreases with increases in the threshold price. For example, table 1
shows that for a threshold price of 500 (equal to  p) the rate of tax on excess
pro¢ts is only slightly more than double that on revenue (5.4 per cent
compared with 2.5 per cent). Moreover, because of this decrease in the rate
of tax on excess pro¢ts, the associated variance of tax revenue is also
decreased (see equation 15). Table 1 shows that, combined with the positive
impact of a higher threshold price on the variance of tax revenue from
the ad valorem royalty, the situation occurs for ^ p  500 that the variance
of tax revenue from the ad valorem royalty exceeds that of the pro¢t-based
royalty.
8Note that the less distorting impact on production of the pro¢t-based tax means that
expected tax revenue can be equated with a small surplus of expected pro¢t for the
company.
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include a threshold price for tax liability diminishes the two key advantages
of such a tax relative to a pro¢t-based tax: its low rate and its low revenue
variability.
Next, consider the performance of the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty relative
to the pro¢t-based royalty in the situation of changes in market conditions,
in particular in the expected level and variability of market prices. In section
2 it was demonstrated that in the case of the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty an
increase in the uncertainty of prices had an analytically ambiguous impact
both on optimal production and, in association with this, on expected tax
revenue. The results in table 2 illustrate this ambiguity by showing that the
impact of increased price uncertainty on optimal production and expected tax
revenue is positive or negative depending on the level of the threshold price
for tax liability. These results show that for the lower threshold price
(^ p  350) the negative impact of increased uncertainty on the probability
mass 1 ÿ F^ p dominates the positive impact on Epjp > ^ p and ET Rv
declines overall, with an associated increase in optimal production. However,
for the higher threshold price ^ p  450 the reverse applies and overall
ET Rv increases (with an associated decline in optimal production from
98.14 to 98.12). Note that this reversal of impact is in contrast to that for the
pro¢t-based royalty where the overall impact in each case is an increase in
expected tax revenue and a decline in optimal production. Consequently, it
may be concluded that in the case of the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty the level
at which the threshold price for tax liability is set determines whether the
impact of an increase in price uncertainty on optimal production and the
associated expected tax revenue is positive or negative.
A second aspect of market conditions is the expected price level, and
table 3 contains details of the impact of £uctuations in this level from the
initial setting of  p  500 on expected tax revenue for each tax system and for
Table 2 Impact of increased price uncertainty
sp  150 sp  200
y Ep ET R y Ep ET R
^ p  350
Ad valorem 97.7 23870.8 1116.3 97.8 23895.2 1092.3
Pro¢t-based 99.3 23882.5 1116.3 98.9 23762.8 1234.2
^ p  450
Ad valorem
a 98.1 24079.0 912.4 98.1 24067.2 924.0
Pro¢t-based 99.4 24086.8 912.4 99.1 23988.8 1009.3
Note:
a At two decimal places production declines from 98.14 to 98.12.
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3 show that at the lower threshold price the volatility of expected tax revenue
in relation to changes in the expected price level is less in the case of the ad
valorem royalty than in the case of the pro¢t-based royalty. However, at the
higher threshold price the reverse situation applies with the ad valorem
royalty exhibiting greater volatility of expected tax revenue in relation to
£uctuations in the expected price level. This feature of the results supports
the previous ¢nding in relation to the level of price uncertainty that the
setting of the threshold price for the ad valorem tax is an important
determinant of its performance. In this situation it is suggested that the
closer the threshold price is set to the level of the expected price, the more
volatile are expected tax revenues with respect to £uctuations in this level.
Moreover, in association with the results in table 1, this ¢nding further
undermines the view that a pro¢t-based royalty is a relatively unreliable form
of generating tax revenue when compared with this modi¢ed ad valorem
royalty.
9
Finally, the numerical version of the model can be used to consider the
relative performance of the two forms of taxation in the context of
improvements in production technology. Table 4 contains details of the
impacts where such an improvement has been represented by a decline in the
Table 3 Impact of fluctuations in the expected price level on expected tax revenue
 p
450 500 550
ET R ET R ET R
^ p  350
Ad valorem
a 846.2 (ÿ24.2%) 1116.3 1407.8 (26.1%)
Pro¢t-based
a 794.2 (ÿ28.9%) 1116.3 1490.5 (33.5%)
^ p  450
Ad valorem
b 630.7 (ÿ30.9%) 912.4 1236.1 (35.5%)
Pro¢t-based
b 649.1 (ÿ28.9%) 912.4 1217.9 (33.5%)
Notes:
a Changes in Ep are:
Evp : 20:8% ; ÿ18:8%
Etp : 20:4% ; ÿ18:6%
b Changes in Ep are:
Evp : 20:4% ; ÿ18:5%
Etp : 20:5% ; ÿ18:6%
9Note that, unlike the situation for expected tax revenues, table 3 shows the associated
£uctuations in expected pro¢ts to be similar for both types of tax in both situations.
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in this table show that, unlike the previous situations, the level of the
threshold price plays no role in determining the impact of this change in the
case of the ad valorem royalty. However, there is also a clear di¡erence in
the performance of the two tax systems in this situation. In particular, while
the increase in the company's expected pro¢ts is similar for the two tax
systems, the increase in expected tax revenue is considerable larger (70 per
cent) in the case of the pro¢t-based royalty than for the ad valorem royalty.
This divergence re£ects the di¡erent base of the two taxes and emphasises
the point that improvements in production technology primarily bene¢t
pro¢ts as distinct from revenues. In addition, this ¢nding highlights an
important advantage of a pro¢t-based royalty over an ad valorem royalty in
that it better enables society to share with the company in the bene¢ts of
technological advances.
4. Conclusion
This article has analysed the modi¢ed form of ad valorem royalty recently
announced by the WA government in relation to gold production. The key
feature of this modi¢cation is a threshold price for gold below which there is
no tax liability.
Section 2 of the article developed a simple analytical model which enabled
a comparison of this modi¢ed ad valorem royalty with a pro¢t-based
royalty. This model used the concept of tax revenue neutrality to establish
the appropriate benchmark for comparing the two tax systems. In particular,
this concept was used to determine the rate of tax on pro¢t required to just
balance its expected revenue with that of the ad valorem royalty.
Development of this model revealed a number of ambiguities in the
performance of the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty relative to the pro¢t-based
Table 4 Impact of an improvement in production technology
d  2:5 d  2:25
y Ep ET R y Ep ET R
^ p  350
Ad valorem 97.7 23870.7 1116.3 108.6 (11.1%) 26523.0 (11.1%) 1240.3 (11.1%)
Pro¢t-based 99.3 23882.5 1116.3 110.4 (11.2%) 26447.3 (10.7%) 1329.3 (19.1%)
^ p  450
Ad valorem 98.1 24079.0 912.4 109.0 (11.1%) 26754.4 (11.1%) 1013.8 (11.1%)
Pro¢t-based 99.4 24086.8 912.4 110.5 (11.2%) 26690.6 (10.8%) 1086.4 (19.1%)
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model in section 3. A key ¢nding of this numerical analysis was the
important role of the level of the threshold price in determining the
characteristics of the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty. Speci¢cally, it was
concluded that the threshold feature diminishes the two main advantages of
an ad valorem royalty relative to a pro¢t-based tax: its low rate and its low
revenue variability. In addition, it was shown that the level at which this
threshold price is set determines not only whether the impact of an increase
in price uncertainty on optimal production and the associated expected tax
revenue is positive or negative, but also the relative volatility of expected tax
revenue from the two tax systems in the context of £uctuations in expected
price.
On this basis it can be argued that the performance of the modi¢ed ad
valorem royalty relative to a pro¢t-based royalty is extremely sensitive to the
setting of the threshold price for tax liability. Moreover, the higher this price
is set, the stronger the argument for preferring a pro¢t-based royalty, even
taking into account the reliability of each form for generating tax revenue.
Add to this the ¢nal demonstration in section 3 of the superiority of the
pro¢t-based royalty in the context of enabling society to share in the bene¢ts
of improvements in production technology, and the grounds for preferring
the modi¢ed ad valorem royalty to a pro¢t-based royalty are considerably
eroded, at least in the context of price-taking companies analysed in this
article.
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Substituting (A3) into (A2) gives:
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E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Substituting (A8) into (A7) and (A7) into (A6) gives:
48 R. Fraser
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999VarT RtET Rt






















ÿ 1 ÿ F
b  cy
y
   
 p
2
 2 1 ÿ F
b  cy
y
   






2 1 ÿ F
b  cy
y
   
ÿ 2t







   
A9
which is reproduced as equation 15 in the main text.
References
Conrad, R.F. and Hool, B. 1981, `Resource taxation with heterogeneous quality and
endogenous reserves,' Journal of Public Economics, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 17^33.
Department of Minerals and Energy 1994, `Petroleum royalties in Western Australia: a
discussion paper,' WA Government, Perth.
Dowell, R. 1978, `Resource rent taxation,' Australian Journal of Management, vol. 3, no. 1,
pp. 127^46.
Emerson, C. and Lloyd, P. 1983, `Improving mineral taxation policy in Australia,' Economic
Record, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 232^44.
Fane, G. and Smith, B. 1986, `Resource rent tax,' in Trengove, C.D. (ed.), Australian Energy
Policies in the 80s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
Fraser, R.W. 1988, `A method for evaluating supply response to price underwriting,'
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 22^36.
Fraser, R.W. 1993, `On the neutrality of the resource rent tax,' Economic Record, vol. 59,
no. 1, pp. 56^60.
Fraser, R.W. 1998, `Lease allocation systems, risk aversion and the resource rent tax,'
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 115^30.
Fraser, R.W. and Kingwell, R. 1997, `Can expected tax revenue be increased by an
investment-preserving switch from ad valorem royalties to a resource rent tax?',
Resources Policy, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 103^8.
Garnaut, A.R. and Clunies-Ross, A. 1975, `Uncertainty, risk aversion and the taxing of
natural resource projects,' Economic Journal, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 272^87.
Garnaut, A.R. and Clunies-Ross, A. 1979, `The neutrality of the resource rent tax',
Economic Record, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 193^201.
Hazell, P.B.R., Jaramillo, M. and Williamson, A. 1990, `The relationship between world
price instability and the prices farmers receive in developing countries,' Journal of
Agricultural Economics, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 227^41.
Analysis of the Western Australian gold royalty 49
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999Kay, J.A. and Keen, M.J. 1983, `How should commodities be taxed?,' European Economic
Review, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 339^58.
Leland, H. 1978, `Optimal risk-sharing and the leasing of natural resources, with application
to oil and gas leasing on the OCS,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 92, no. 3,
pp. 413^38.
50 R. Fraser
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999